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BOOK REVIEWS
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS. Adopted and promulgated by
the American Law Institute, at Philadelphia, Pa., May 15, 1942.
St. Paul, Minnesota: American Law Institute Publishers, 1942. Pp. xiv,
688.
To the growing collection of volumes of the Restatement of the Law is
now added one dealing with the subject of Judgments or, more par-
ticularly, their validity and their effect on subsequent controversies.
Though confined in scope, since enforcement of judgments is not con-
sidered, the work bears the evidence of the same careful planning, ar-
rangement and format that has marked earlier publications of the
American Law Institute. In some one hundred and thirty sections is set
forth an analysis of the elements necessary to a valid judgment whether
in rem or in personam, the effect of invalidity with its complementary
problems of direct and collateral attack, the scope of res adjudicata, and
the binding effect thereof, and lastly a consideration of the problems
arising in conjunction with equitable relief against judgments. It is not,
nor was it intended to be, a complete treatment of the subject, for the
Restatement is clearly not designed as a series of texts on isolated sub-
jects. Adequate cross-reference to companion volumes is, therefore, pro-
vided so that overlapping of subject matter has been avoided. It is,
however, an essential starting point for any investigation of a topic of the
law which, if not highly irrational, has at least presented the anomaly of
a court taking jurisdiction of a cause for the purpose of determining that
it lacks jurisdiction.
Particularly significant are the sections dealing with jurisdiction over
foreign persons and corporations found within the state or conducting
business therein. The view of Judge Goodrich, in his work on Conflict of
Laws, regarding jurisdiction over such persons as to matters disconnected
with the business being transacted within the state' is met with a caveat
in the official restatement 2 drafted by the Institute's Committee on Judg-
ments on which he served. The Committee's reluctance to enter such a
debatable field should not, however, be too severely criticized for there is
but slender basis in precedent for any definite position on that point.
The Illinois lawyer reading this work will find some positions taken
which do not accord with his understanding of the existing law of his own
state. Too close similarity between law in fact and law as restated would
arouse suspicion that Illinois had achieved that static condition from
which only decay could ensue. On such problems, therefore, as venue in
case of confession of judgment,3 the right to bring several actions for
1 Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws (St. Paul, 1938), 174.
2 Restatement, Judgments § 30, p. 123.
3 Compare Restatement, Judgments § 18, p. 88, comment (e), with Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 174(5), as interpreted in Houston v. Ingels, 318 Ill. App. 383,
48 N.E. (2d) 196 (1943).
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distinct harms arising from one act,4 and the right to maintain two
actions in case the tortious injury produces a period of lingering illness
and ultimately results in death, 5 a marked difference exists between the
local law and the views of the Restatement. This conflict may well serve
as a sign that dynamic, rather than static, conditions prevail in the law
of this state.
A caveat should also be expressed in connection with Section 110 of
the Restatement which provides that when a court decides that one of
the parties has a right or title superior to that of the other in certain
property, then "the judgment has the effect of an involuntary transfer
from the unsuccessful party to the other." Such may be the case in
actions to quiet title, but would hardly be recognized as the rule in Illinois
in cases involving specific performance of contract and the like,6 where
a deed of conveyance would be regarded as essential and the judgment
or decree would not, ipso facto, operate to transfer title.
One unfortunate piece of cross-reference work seems to have oc-
curred. In discussing the effect of a judgment in a representative or class
action, Section 26 indicates that the court possesses jurisdiction over the
members of the class if the action is "properly" brought. To determine
when such action is so instituted, the reader is referred to Sections 86 and
116. The first of these cross-references does not, except by indirection,
touch on the effect of fraud or collusion on the part of those conducting
the litigation. The second suggests that equitable relief may sometimes
be available if the proceedings "were not conducted with due regard" for
the interests of the persons alleged to have been represented, but does
not elaborate thereon. The specific effect of fraud in obtaining such a
judgment, well illustrated by the decision in Hansberry v. Lee, 7 is pri-
marily considered under Section 91, but even there the specific topic is
not treated to any appreciable extent. A clearer note to Section 26 might
have been constructed. Such a minor defect, however, should not be used
to detract credit from a work otherwise skillfully and carefully prepared.
W. F. ZAcHABxAS
4 Compare Restatement, Judgments § 62, particularly comment (e), with
Clancey v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N.E. 729 (1930). The view adopted in the Re-
statement does, however, represent that of the overwhelming majority of states.
See, for example, Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A.
59 (1922).
5 Compare Restatement, Judgments § 92, with Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1882)
and Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 Ill. 138, 33 N.E. (2d) 211 (1941).
6 Compare Restatement, Judgments § 110, with Poole v. Koons, 252 IIl. 49, 96
N. E. 556 (1911) and Eich v. Czervonko, 330 Ill. 455, 161 N.E. 864 (1928).
7 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940).
